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This paper presents new closed form solutions for the valuation of
European put options and of "down-an-in" barrier options written on
leveraged equity. Unlike in past literature (Toft and Prucyk, 1997) and in
k e e p i n gw i t he m p i r i c a le v i d e n c e ,t h em o d e la l l o w se q u i t yt or e t a i nv a l u e
even after the ﬁrm’s default and reorganisation. This stylised fact can sig-
niﬁcantly alter the valuation of equity put and "down-and-in" options as
bankruptcy costs, bargaining power of equity holders, debt maturity and
other ﬁrm parameters change. The value of "in-the-money" puts often
decreases in the ﬁrm’s assets volatility. The model can produce a variety
of realistic implied equity volatility "skews".
Keywords: equity put options, leveraged equity, default and reorgan-
isation, barrier options, "down-and-in" options.
JEL classiﬁcation: G13; G33.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the valuation of put options and "down-and-in" barrier options writ-
ten on leveraged equity, whereby equity is itself a claim on the ﬁrm’s assets and is
subject to default risk. New closed form solutions for valuing put options are provided
on the assumption that the underlying equity retains value even after the ﬁrm’s default
and reorganisation. Such assumption (hereafter the "recovery assumption") differen-
tiates this paper from previous contributions, notably Toft and Prucyk’s (1997). The
focus on the valuation of put options and "down-and-in" options is due to the fact that
the "recovery assumption" affects these options more than others. 1The "recovery assumption" is supported by substantial empirical evidence as re-
ported in Gilson, Long and Lang (1990), Weiss (1990), Franks and Torous (1994) and
others. Such evidence tells of absolute priority rule violations during ﬁrm reorgan-
isations following default, either during private debt renegotiations or during formal
bankruptcy proceedings. So equity holders keep a valuable claim on the assets of the
ﬁrm even after default and even if debtors have not been paid in full. Moreover, even
after the ﬁrm has defaulted and its stock has been delisted, the stock can keep trading
"over the counter". These stylised facts mainly affect the valuation of equity put options
and "down-and-in" barrier options, for such options appreciate precisely when equity
value decreases and the ﬁrm approaches default.
The main result of the paper is the closed form solution for the put option value
given that default is not an absorbing barrier for the ﬁrm’s stock price process. Another
central result is that the "recovery assumption", bankruptcy costs and the bargaining
power of equity holders during reorganisation can signiﬁcantly affect the valuation of
put options and "down-and-in" barrier options. One consequence is that the value of
an equity put can decrease in the ﬁrm’s assets volatility as the put is deep in the money
and the ﬁrm approaches default. Moreover, the value of a put decreases in the ﬁrm’s
debt average maturity. These results are more material for the valuation of long term
put options, such as "Leaps" or over the counter options, since the longer is the time to
expiry, the more likely is the default of the underlying equity and the more critical is
the "recovery assumption".
The "recovery assumption" as well as debt maturity seem capable to explain a va-
riety of patterns for the volatility "skews" that are implied by observed equity option
prices.
The paper is organised as follows. After a reference to the most relevant literature,
theequityputvaluationmodelispresentedandcomparativestaticsareperformed. Then
the analysis moves to the implied equity volatility "skews" that the put valuation model
can explain and to the valuation of "down-and-in" options. The conclusions follow.
1.1 Literature
Thispaperviewsandvaluesequityputoptionsand"down-and-in"optionsascompound
claims, i.e. claims written on equity, whereby equity is itself a claim on the ﬁrm’s
assets. The valuation of equity options as compound claims started with Geske (1979)
and has recently developed through the work of Toft (1994), Toft and Prucyk (1997)
and Ericsson (2002).
Geske and Ericsson view the equity underlying an option as a claim of ﬁnite matu-
rity on the ﬁrm’s assets. Instead in Toft and Prucyk and in this paper equity is viewed as
a time independent claim of indeﬁnite maturity, which simpliﬁes the option valuation
model and seems realistic.
2Geske, Ericsson, Toft and Prucyk concentrate on the valuation of "European" equity
call options, whereas this paper considers the valuation of equity put options and of
"down-and-in" barrier options, for which the accurate modelling of ﬁnancial distress
is much more critical than for the valuation of call options. For example, Toft and
Prucyk assumed that equity becomes worthless and that the equity call option is lost
upon the ﬁrm’s default, which is reasonable because default implies that the call will
almost certainly not be exercised. But an equity put option is not expected to be lost
upon default and it seems inaccurate to assume that equity is worthless after default,
since the stock and the put option can keep trading after default even if the stock is
delisted.
The literature on "strategic" structural models of credit risk, e.g. Anderson, Sun-
daresan and Tychon (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan
(2000), has already recognised that in ﬁnancial distress equity retains value when debt
can be renegotiated. So this paper brings the results of such literature to bear for the
valuation of equity options.
2 PUT OPTIONS VALUATION WHEN EQUITY
IS STILL VALUABLE AFTER DEFAULT
This section presents a valuation model for put options written on leveraged equity, in
the spirit of Toft and Prucyk (1997). The ﬁrm whose equity underlies the put option
can default and can be reorganised. But unlike in Toft and Prucyk, here the underly-
ing equity retains value even after default and reorganisation, which is a stylised fact
featuring also in various recent structural models of credit risk and conﬁrmed by the
empirical literature.
In particular, the put valuation model follows Fan and Sundaresan (2000) in assum-
ing that the ﬁrm defaults and is reorganised as soon as the ﬁrm’s assets value V drops to
alo w erbar rie rVs. Firm reorganisation averts bankruptcy and theassociatedbankruptcy
costs. As in Fan and Sundaresan, reorganisation takes the form of a debt-equity swap,
whereby debt holders exchange their debt claim for an equity claim on the ﬁrm’s assets
and previous equity holders retain a diluted equity claim. This formulation of reorgan-
isation does not seem restrictive since a debt-equity swap may also proxy the payoffs
to debt and equity holders that are associated with other forms of debt renegotiations,
such as strategic debt service or negotiations in a formal bankruptcy proceeding.
Theusualassumptionsofstructuralmodelsofcreditriskunderliealsothismodel. In
particular perfect markets, absence of arbitrage and dynamic market completeness are
assumed. The risk neutral process of the value of the ﬁrm’s assets follows a geometric
Brownian motion such as
dV = V · (r − b) · dt + V · s · dz (1)
where b is the assets pay-out rate, r is the default free short interest rate that is
assumed constant over time, s is the assets volatility and dz is the differential of a
3Wiener process.
ThemodelforequityvalueE (V )treatsdebtofﬁniteaverage maturityasperLeland
(1998). So at any time the ﬁrm generated net cash ﬂows for equity holders are equal to
cf = bV − C (1 − tx)+m(D(V ) − F) (2)
where bV is the assets generated cash ﬂow, C are the coupon payments to debt
holders, m is the yearly debt "roll-over" rate as in Leland (1998), D(V ) is total debt
value, F is total debt face value, tx is the corporation tax rate. In any short interval dt,a
fraction m·dt of debt is retired at face value m·dt·F and substituted by newly issued
debt worth m · dt · D(V ), so that the nominal amount of outstanding debt is constant
over time. Coupons payments generate a tax shield equal to Ctx.
Using standard valuation arguments, we can deduce that the value of the ﬁrm’s
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where a denotes the fraction of assets value V that would be lost in case of assets
liquidation and where y is a coefﬁcient comprised between 0 and 1 that captures the
bargaining power of equity holders in the reorganisation process that follows default.
Condition 3b is a no-bubbles condition. Condition 3c states the payoff to equity holders
upon reorganisation at Vs. Condition 3d is a "smooth pasting" condition, which implies
that equityholders choose thereorganisation barrierVs endogenouslyso as tomaximise
equity value E (V ).
In this model ﬁrm reorganisation always prevents liquidation and liquidation costs
are never incurred. The y parameter is key. When tx =0 , y can be thought of as the
fraction of the bankruptcy costs saved through reorganisation that is attributed to equity
holders.
The solutions to equation 3a for equity and the endogenous reorganisation barrier
Vs are
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Tx (V ) is the value of the tax shield associated with coupon payments. The balance















Some remarks about these results are ﬁtting. The parameter y can capture either
the effect of concessions from debt holders to equity holders when debt is privately
renegotiated or the effect of violations to the absolute priority rule during a formal
bankruptcy proceeding. So the above pricing model seems suitable even when reorgan-
isation tales place within a bankruptcy proceeding. The model just requires an estimate
of ya,w h e r e a sy and a need not be known individually.








r(q−1), which is special case of the endogenous default barrier in Leland (1994a).





(1−ya)(qm−1) reduces to Vs =
C+mF
m+r qm
(qm−1) ,w h i c h
is a special case of Leland (1994b).
Having presented the model for the claims on the underlying ﬁrm, we can now value
a put written on the ﬁrm’s equity.
2.1 The put option
Standard valuation arguments imply that the value of a "European" put option P (V,t)







dV 2 s2V 2 +
dP (V,t)
dV
(r − b)V − r · P (V,t)=0 (8)
P (V,T)=m a x( X − E (V ),0) (9)
P (V →∞ ,t) → 0 (10)
P (Vs,t)=Pdi (yaV,t,Vs) (11)
where Pdi (yaV,t,Vs) is the value of a "down-and-in" put option on yaV, with
strike X, time to expiry T and with "down-and-in" barrier set equal to Vs. Without loss
of generality, today’s date is t =0so that T is the expiry date and also measures the
residual life of the option.
Condition 9 is the put option payoff at maturity T. Condition 10 states that the put
is approximately worthless as the ﬁrm’s assets V and hence the ﬁrm’s equity E (V )
become very valuable. Condition 11 states that, as V = Vs for some t ≤ T,t h eﬁrm is
5reorganised, equity holders receive yaVs and the value of the equity put becomes equal
to the value of a "down-and-in" put on yaVs that is "knocked-in" precisely as and when
V = Vs. In other words, condition 11 states that, as the ﬁrm is reorganised, the nature
of the equity claim on the ﬁrm’s assets irreversibly changes from E (V ) to yaV and
that after reorganisation the put on equity no longer is a claim on E (V ) but a claim on
yaV.
The meaning of and the solution to equation 8 and respective conditions are clearer
if we write the equity put value as
P (V,t)=Pdo (E (V ),t,V s)+Pdi (yaV,t,Vs) (12)
where Pdo (E (V ),t,V s) is the value of a "down-and-out" put option on E (V ),
with strike X, time to expiry T and with "down-and-out" barrier equal to Vs.S o ,
when the underlying ﬁrm can default and be reorganised, the equity put P (V,t) can be
viewed and valued as the sum of a "down-and-out" put option on equity value before
default E (V ) plus a "down-and-in" put option on equity value after default yaV.T h e
"down-and-in" and "down-and-out" barriers are the same and are equal to the default
and reorganisation barrier Vs.
This put valuation model acknowledges that the put and the equity claim are not lost
when the ﬁrm defaults. After default equity is still valuable and the put is still "alive".
More precisely, since upon default and reorganisation equity value is E (Vs)=yaVs,
after default equity value is yaV. And if, as in Toft and Prucyk (1997), we assume that
equity is worthless after default or equivalently that y =0 , we implicitly assume that
Pdi (0,t,V s)=0 . When valuing call equity options, it may be safe to assume that
defaulted equity is worthless, but not so when valuing put options or "down and in"
options, whose value heavily depends on the "down side" of equity. The comparative
statics below conﬁrm this point.
From standard references (e.g. Wilmott page 202, 1998) we know that the value of
a "down-an-in" European put option on yaV with time to expiry T, strike X and "in"
barrier Vs is


























































































Then appendix A shows that the solution for the "down-and-out" put on E (V ) is
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Vx needs to be found numerically and is such that E (Vx)=X.
Equations 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 provide the values of claims that pay respectively X,
E (V ), V , D(V ) and Tx (V ) at maturity T if at T equity value is yaVs <E(V ) <X,
and only if assets value V has not reached the "down-and-out" barrier Vs before T.
Having presented theput valuation model, thecomparativestatics of suchmodel follow.
2.2 Comparative statics
We consider a base case scenario with the following base case parameters: X =5 0 ,
b =3 % , s = 20%, r =4 % , F =5 0 , m =0 , C =0 .05 · F, a = 20%, y =1 , tx =0 ,
T =1 . Figure 1 shows how put value in the base case when y is either 1 or 0, whereby
y is a proxy for the bargaining power of equity holders during reorganisation. Figure 1
shows that the range of variation of put values can be wide as the bargaining power of
equity holders varies. Put value decreases in y, since equity value E (V ) increases in y.
Put values exhibit a kink when V equals Vs (notice that Vs decreases as y decreases).
The kink is due to default and reorganisation of the equity claim. After reorganisation
the equity value function E (V ) becomes less steep in V . The kink suggests that E (V )
is concave in the ﬁrm’s assets value V as V approaches Vs from above. It follows that
soon before default and reorganisation put value decreases if the ﬁrm’s assets volatility
s increases. This feature is absent in past compound option models.
Figure 1 shows that as V increases and the put gets more "in-the-money", a rise
is y produces a greater absolute decrease in put value. The reason is that a rise in y
produces a greater absolute increase in equity value E (V ) when V is low and that the
the absolute value of the put "delta" is greater when V is low. Instead, a rise in y causes
a greater percentage drop in put value when V is low and the put is less "out–of-the-
money".
8Since in the put valuation formulas the bargaining power parameter y is everywhere
multiplied by the bankruptcy cost parameter a and vice versa, the effect on put value of
a given percentage change in y is the same as the effect on put value of that same per-
centage change in a. So all that has been said about the effect of y on put value P (V,t)
is valid also for the effect of a on P (V,t). Thus the assumption about the recovery
value of equity after default, the bargaining power of equity holders and potential bank-
ruptcy costs can signiﬁcantly affect equity put option value. This is even more the case
as T increases.
Figure 2 shows how put value P (V,T) changes around the base scenario value as,
ceteris paribus, assets volatility s, assets payout rate b and debt average maturity m
change in turn.
Put value decreases in assets payout b,s i n c eE (V ) increases in b.P u tv a l u em a y
decrease as well as increase in the ﬁrm’s assets volatility s. Figure 2 shows that, as
usual, put value increases in assets volatility when the put is not "deep-in-the-money",
but decreases in volatility when the ﬁrm approaches default and the put becomes "deep-
in-the-money". In fact, especially when V approaches Vs, equity value E (V ) increases
in volatility. Moreover, as V approaches Vs, Figure 1 shows how put value is a kinked
concave function of the ﬁrm’s assets value V .
Unlike in Toft and Prucyk (1997), this put valuation model encompasses the case in
which the ﬁrm’s debt has ﬁnite average maturity. Figure 2 shows how put value gener-
ally increases in m and debt average maturity 1
m decreases. The reason is that, ceteris
paribus, shorter debt maturity decreases equity value E(V ) when V approaches the
default barrier Vs and the option is "in-the-money". Moreover, increasing m increases
Vs.W h e n V is very high, shorter maturity increases equity value, but the option is
"out-of-the money". As the put gets very "far from the money", changes in m produce
signiﬁcant proportional changes in put value.
Put value decreases in r because equity value rises in r and because the present
value of the ﬁnal payoff decreases in r.A st h eﬁrm’s leverage rises, i.e. as F and C
rise, the default barrier Vs rises, so that reorganisation becomes a more likely prospect
and bankruptcy costs increase too since such costs are equal to aVs. As a result put
value becomes more sensitive to the prospect of ﬁrm reorganisation and to y and a.
Put value usually increases as time to expiry T gets longer, but not so when the put
is "deep-in-the-money" and the ﬁrm approaches default, since put value after default
decreases in T. Finally, unreported simulations showed that also in the present model
early exercise of the "American" put can be optimal even in the absence of dividends.
We can conclude that the differences between the above comparative statics and
those of ordinary puts conﬁrm the signiﬁcant impact that ﬁrm reorganisation can have
on put value.
2.3 When markets are incomplete
The model above assumes dynamic market completeness, which allows us to regard
the value of the ﬁrm’s assets V as the price of a traded asset and to assume that its risk
neutral process is as in equation 1. But even if the market is incomplete the proposed
9model is still valid if only (r − b) is substituted with (n − λs),w h e r en is the real drift
of V and λ is the market price of V -risk. The reason for this adjustment is that market
incompleteness causes the risk neutral process for V to be no longer as per equation 1
but
dV = V (n − λs)dt + sV dz. (25)
Market incompleteness seems more appropriate an assumption when the ﬁrm’s
stock is not traded in the stock market or when the stock has been delisted after de-
fault. In this regard, Ericsson (1998) argues that, as long as the ﬁrm’s stock is traded,
the value process of the ﬁrm’s assets V can be replicated by trading in the stock. But
replication is more unlikely after delisting because the stock would not be trading in the
stock market any more. So we may want to assume market incompleteness just after
default. In such case (n − λs) should substitute (r − b) just in equations 13, 15, 16, 17
and 18.
2.4 Calibrating the model and the implied volatility skew
The above presented put valuation model depends on more and different parameters
than the Black and Scholes put model. Some parameters like m, F and C can be
estimated from balance sheet data, some like r and tx from the ﬁnancial environment
and some like b, s, a and y can be inferred from (the time series of) equity prices and
put prices. The parameters b, s, a and y can be simply "calibrated" to present equity
and put prices or estimated through a maximum likelyhood method from times series
of prices as in Ericsson and Reneby (2001). Such parameters offer more "ﬂexibility" in
calibrating the put valuation model than the Black and Scholes model does. If the above
model is used in substitution to the Black and Scholes model, need to employ implied
volatility skews to explain the observed prices of put options with different strikes and
expiry dates can be eliminated. Moreover, the calibration of the above model provides
parameter estimates that can be used to value also the ﬁrm’s debt. In other words the
proposed model established a link between equity put options and spreads on the ﬁrm’s
debt.
A virtue of the proposed put valuation model is that it can predict various patterns
of implied equity volatility "skews" as y, a, m, F and b change as shown in Table 3.
Overall the model seems quite capable of explaining the types of volatility skews that
can be estimated from observed option prices.
The ﬁrst two sections of table 3 show that, even when the ﬁrm is far from default
(V = 200 and F =5 0 ) implied volatility decreases as bankruptcy costs and the bar-
gaining power of equity holders (i.e. as a and y) increase. The third section shows how
implied volatility rises as debt average maturity ( 1
m) decreases and the fourth shows
how volatility increases as leverage increases. A volatility skew can be detected in all
the sections of the table, whereby implied equity volatility is high when the strike price
of the put is lower, in keep with empirical evidence and with the fact that leveraged
equity is more volatile when the ﬁrm approaches default.
After analysing how the ﬁrm’s default and reorganisation affect the valuation of
plain put options, the following section turns to the valuation of barrier options.
103 VALUATION OF BARRIER OPTIONS
Like put options, "down-and-in" barrier options on leveraged equity are here of interest
because their value is more sensitive than the value of other options to the "recovery as-
sumption" for defaulted equity. Like put options, "down-and-in" options are amenable
to closed form solutions. Given the above framework and the "recovery assumption"
for equity value after default, the formula for a "down-and-in" put with "in" barrier at
E (Vu)=U such that Vx >V u >V s is:
Pdi (V,t,U)=P (V,t) − Pdo (V,t,U) (26)
where P (V,t) is as before given by equations 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and where
Pdo (V,t,U) is the value of a "down-an-out" put on equity E (V ) with "out" barrier at
E (Vu)=U, with strike X and residual life T. It follows that
Pdo (V,t,U)=O(X,t,U) − O(E (V ),t,U) (27)
where, if only Vs is substituted with Vu, the formula for O(X,t,U) is the same as
the right hand side of equation 20 and the formula for O(E (V ),t,U) is the same as
the right hand side of equation 21.
Notice that, since Vu >V s the value of the "down and out" put option Pdo (V,t,U)
is not affected by default and the "recovery assumption", since the put is "knocked out"
before default. Instead the value of the plain put P (V,t) is clearly depends on default
and the "recovery assumption" as apparent from equations 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and
24. So from equation 26 it follows that the value of the "down-and-in" put on leveraged
equity Pdi (V,t,U) also depends on default and the "recovery assumption". Moreover,
any percentage change in P (V,t) produced by a change in the recovery parameters y
or a will correspond to an even greater percentage change in Pdi (V,t,U),p r e c i s e l y
because y or a affect P (V,t) but do not affect Pdo (V,t,U).
Similar formulas and arguments are valid also for "down-and-in" call options as
shown in appendix B. These arguments highlight that the precise modelling of equity
during ﬁnancial distress is particularly important for both "down-and-in" put and call
options, but not for "down-and-out" options.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented new closed form solutions for the valuation of equity put
options and "down-and-in" barrier options on leveraged equity. The basic assumption
("recovery assumption") is that such options are not lost and that equity retains value
even after the ﬁrm defaults, in keeping with empirical evidence on the recovery value
of the ﬁrm’s equity after default. The "recovery assumption" distinguishes this paper
from past literature, in particular from Toft and Prucyk (1997).
The analysis has shown that the equity put option is very sensitive to the "recovery
assumption", to bankruptcy costs, to the bargaining power of equity holders during
11reorganisation and to debt average maturity. Unlike is the Black and Scholes model,
equity put value decreases in assets volatility when the put is "deep-in-the-money" and
the ﬁrm approaches distress. These results are more material when the life of the option
is longer."Down-and-in put" options are much more sensitive then plain puts to the
modelling of distressed equity and to the "recovery assumption".
The "recovery assumption" enables the put valuation model to predict a richer set of
shapes of implied volatility skews of the type observed in the equity options markets.
These results also suggest that equity call option prices rather than equity put option
prices should be used to imply equity volatility, since the former, unlike the latter, are
relatively insensitive to the "recovery assumption" of distressed equity.
Finally future research can employ observed equity prices, put option prices and the
closed form solutions here presented to estimate the ﬁrm’s assets value, drift, volatility,
bankruptcy costs and bargaining power parameters to be used in pricing the ﬁrm’s debt.
Appendix A. Derivation of the Put option formula
This appendix derives equations 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24.
We can write D(V )=C+mP
r+m + AV qm, with A =
³
−C+mP




−qm. Then by applying Ito’s lemma it follows that
d(D(V )) = d(AV qm)=n(qm) · AV qm · dt + AV qm · qs· dz
where
n(w)=( r − b)w +
1
2
w(w − 1)s2.( A - 1 )
So the term (AV qm) follows a geometric Brownian motion.
Then the present value of a claim Q(D(V ),V x,T) that pays D(V )=C+mP
r+m +
AV qm at time T if VT ≥ Vx and that pays nothing otherwise is:







































and where N (u) is the cumulative of the standard normal density with u as the











Using results for valuing "down-and-out" barrier options (see e.g. Wilmott (1998)
at page 192), the value of a claim Q(D(V ),V s,V x,T) that pays V at time T only if
VT ≥ Vx and only if Vt >V s for any time t<T, and that pays nothing otherwise is:



















































































Then we can write
O(D(V ),t)=Q(D(V ),V s,V s,T) − Q(D(V ),V s,V x,T) (A-9)
which gives equation 23. Similarly we can derive
O(V,t)=Q(V,Vs,V s,T) − Q(V,Vs,V x,T) (A-10)
O(Tx (V ),t)=Q(Tx (V ),V s,V s,T) − Q(Tx (V ),V s,V x,T) (A-11)
O(X,t)=Q(X,Vs,V s,T) − Q(X,Vs,V x,T). (A-12)
Finally, boundary conditions 9, 10, 11 and the linearity of partial differential equa-
tion 8 allows us to write equation 12 and
Pdo (E (V ),T)=O(V,T)+O(Tx (V ),T) − O(D(V ),T). (A-13)
13Appendix B. The valuation of barrier call options on
leveraged equity
For completeness the value of a "down-and-in" barrier option on leveraged equity is
here reported. The value of a "down-and-in" call Cdi (V,t,U) on E (V ) with "in"
barrier at E (Vu)=U such that Vx >V u >V s, with maturity T and strike X is:
Cdi (V,t,U)=C (V,t) − Cdo (V,t,U)
where C (V,t) is the value of a call option on leveraged equity E (V ) given that
equity after default and reorganisation is worth Va yand where
Cdo (V,t,U) is a "down-and-out" call on E (V ) with "out" barrier E (Vu)=U.
C (V,t) and Cdo (V,t,U) also have strike X and maturity T.
WecanderiveaclosedformsolutionforC (V,t), since before defaultput-call parity
allowsustowrite: C (V,t)+Xe−rT = P (V,t)+C0 (V,t),w h e r eC0 (V,t)is thevalue
of call similar to C (V,t) but which has 0 strike price. C0 (V,t) is equivalent to the right
to receive equity E (V ) at time T.
Then, employing arguments similar to the ones in appendix A, we can write
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Put in the base case
Put if s = 30%
Put if b = 6%
Put if m = 40%
Figure 2: Differences in put value P (V,T) from the base case scenario as, ceteris
paribus, s = 30%, b =6 %and m = 40%.
18a = 10% a = 20% a = 30% a = 10% a = 20% a = 30%
X = 40 33.3% 32.6% 31.6% 33.6% 32.4% 31.4%
X = 45 32.8% 32.1% 31.3% 32.5% 31.8% 31.1%
X = 50 32.3% 31.8% 31.0% 32.1% 31.5% 30.7%
X = 55 31.9% 31.4% 30.7% 31.7% 31.1% 30.5%
X = 60 31.6% 31.1% 30.5% 31.3% 30.8% 30.2%
y = 0 y = 0.5 y = 1 y = 0 y = 0.5 y = 1
X = 40 33.8% 33.3% 32.6% 33.6% 33.1% 32.4%
X = 45 33.3% 32.8% 32.1% 33.0% 32.5% 31.9%
X = 50 32.8% 32.3% 31.8% 32.5% 32.1% 31.5%
X = 55 32.3% 31.9% 31.4% 32.1% 31.7% 31.1%
X = 60 32.0% 31.6% 31.1% 31.7% 31.3% 30.8%
m = 0 m = 0.2 m = 0.4 m = 0 m = 0.2 m = 0.4
X = 40 32.6% 33.4% 33.6% 32.4% 33.2% 33.4%
X = 45 32.1% 32.8% 33.0% 31.9% 32.6% 33.4%
X = 50 31.8% 32.3% 32.4% 31.5% 30.1% 32.1%
X = 55 31.4% 31.9% 31.9% 31.1% 31.6% 31.6%
X = 60 31.1% 31.5% 31.5% 30.8% 31.1% 31.2%
F = 50 F = 100 F = 150 F = 50 F = 100 F = 150
X = 40 32.6% 40.7% 42.2% 32.2% 40.9% 43.4%
X = 45 32.1% 40.3% 42.3% 31.9% 40.4% 43.4%
X = 50 31.8% 39.9% 42.2% 31.5% 40.0% 43.3%
X = 55 31.4% 39.5% 42.0% 31.1% 39.6% 43.0%
X = 60 31.1% 39.1% 41.6% 30.8% 39.2% 42.5%
b = 0% b = 3% b = 6% b = 0% b = 3% b = 6%
X = 40 33.3% 32.6% 31.6% 33.7% 32.6% 30.9%
X = 45 32.7% 32.1% 31.3% 33.1% 31.9% 30.6%
X = 50 32.2% 31.8% 31.1% 32.5% 31.5% 30.3%
X = 55 31.7% 31.4% 30.9% 32.0% 31.1% 30.0%
X = 60 31.2% 31.1% 30.7% 31.6% 30.8% 29.8%
T = 1 T = 0.5
Implied volatility skews when the Black and Scholes put valuation model is 
calibrated to the put prices predicted by the model in this paper.
Figure 3: The table shows the effect on implied volatility of departures from the base
case scenario in which V = 200, X =5 0 , b =3 % , s = 20%, r =4 % , F =5 0 ,
m =0 , C =0 .05 · F, a = 20%, y =1 , tx =0 , T =1 .
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